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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY 
AND MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY INDICES: 
AN APPLICATION TO SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
 






Hypothesis testing and statistical precision in the context of nonparametric efficiency and 
productivity measurement have been investigated since the early 1990s. Recent contributions 
focus on this matter through the use of resampling methods—i.e., bootstrapping techniques. 
However, empirical evidence is still practically non-existent. This gap is more noticeable in the 
case of banking efficiency studies, where the literature is immense. In this paper, we explore 
productivity growth and productive efficiency for Spanish savings banks over the (initial) post-
deregulation period 1992–1998 using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and bootstrapping 
techniques. Results show that productivity growth has occurred, mainly due to improvement in 
production possibilities, and that mean efficiency has remained fairly constant over time. The 
bootstrap analysis yields further evidence, as for many firms productivity growth, or decline, is 
not statistically significant. With regard to efficiency measurement, the bootstrap reveals that the 
disparities in the original efficiency scores of some firms are lessened to a great extent. 
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Desde principios de los años noventa ha habido avances notables en el contraste de hipótesis 
dentro del contexto de la medición de la eficiencia y la productividad mediante técnicas 
paramétricas. Las contribuciones más recientes han enfocado el tema a través de métodos de re-
muestreo -conocidos en la literatura como técnicas bootstrap-. Sin embargo, prácticamente no ha 
habido aplicaciones, algo también patente en el estudio de la eficiencia de la empresa bancaria. 
En este artículo, analizamos la eficiencia productiva y el crecimiento de la productividad de las 
cajas de ahorro españolas durante el periodo 1992-1998 a través de técnicas no paramétricas 
(DEA) y de técnicas bootstrap, con el fin de poder realizar inferencia estadística. Los resultados 
indican que la productividad ha aumentado, principalmente debido a una mejora en las 
posibilidades de producción, mientras que la eficiencia promedio no ha variado 
sustancialmente. El análisis bootstrap revela que, en el caso de la productividad, para muchas 
empresas su aumento o disminución no es estadísticamente significativo. En cuanto a la 
eficiencia, muestra que las diferencias entre empresas individuales se reducen de manera notable 
cuando consideramos intervalos de confianza. 
 
Palabras clave: bootstrap, técnicas no paramétricas, eficiencia, productividad, cajas de ahorro. 
 
 1. Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the study of the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial institutions has increased enormously,
as revealed in the comprehensive survey by Berger and Humphrey (1997). Although the literature is still
growing at a fast rate, their study covered 130 relevant studies that applied frontier eﬃciency analysis
to this type of ﬁrms in 21 countries, using both parametric and nonparametric techniques to measure
eﬃciency. Their attempts were manifold, and included directions for further research. Among these was
suggested the issue of deriving conﬁdence intervals for eﬃciency measures in order to compare them in a
statistical sense. Speciﬁcally, they suggest that new research in the area of eﬃciency should try to provide
conﬁdence intervals for the eﬃciency estimates they generate.
This question is closely related to the long-standing debate on what technique should be chosen for
eﬃciency measurement. Both parametric and nonparametric techniques have been widely used, and the
consensus is that neither technique is better than the other,1 because of the trade-oﬀ they are aﬀected by.
Namely, parametric techniques have the advantage of allowing for random error; in contrast, they impose
a particular functional form that presupposes the shape of the frontier. On the other hand, nonparametric
techniques tend to envelope data more closely, but they do not allow for random error.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of the most widely used among the latter. This inability to
allow for random error has induced many authors to label it as deterministic. However, recent literature
has silenced “this tired refrain”, as Lovell (2000) deﬁnes it. In particular, Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999a,
2000) deﬁne a statistical model which allows for the determination of the statistical properties of the
nonparametric estimators in the multi-input and multi-output case.
The important practical implication of their ﬁndings is that statistical inference is possible. Hence,
nonparametric methods to measure eﬃciency would keep their advantages, but would somehow allow
for random error. For this, a computer-intensive approach is used: the bootstrap (Efron, 1979; Efron
and Tibshirani, 1993; Horowitz, 1997, 2001a,b). It consists of resampling an original sample extensively,
until an estimate of a statistic’s sampling distribution is inductively arrived at. This estimated sampling
distribution is then used to make population inferences. We should point out that previous attempts
to provide statistical precision to DEA eﬃciency scores have been made, and were brilliantly surveyed
by Grosskopf (1996). One of these, the approach suggested by Banker (1993, 1996), which made some
assumptions on the Data Generating Process (DGP). In contrast, the bootstrap does not need to rely on
asymptotic theory to estimate the distribution of a statistic. Instead, it is a resampling method which
may be implemented much more easily due to the availability of modern computing power. As such, it has
has become widely accepted as an econometric procedure and is easily implemented in standard software
packages such as RATS, TSP, LIMDEP, SHAZAM, STATA, or S-PLUS.
It is therefore also important to judge the relevance of these methods in econometric terms. In every
econometric study, a crucial issue is that of the statistical signiﬁcance of the results achieved. When
providing the results of a regression equation, it is often the case that we may well choose to stress the
1In fact, out of those 130 studies surveyed by Berger and Humphrey (1997), 69 were nonparametric.interval estimate over the point estimate. Until the appearance of early contributions on hypothesis testing
in DEA which relied on asymptotic theory, or the most recent which rely on bootstrapping techniques,
this was not possible when reporting on the results generated by nonparametric eﬃciency measurement
techniques.2 Now we can use these methods to test for statistical signiﬁcance among diﬀerences in ﬁrms’
eﬃciency scores, in much the same way that t ratios are used in classical regression studies.
Banking in general, and the Spanish banking industry in particular, is a fascinating context in which
to applying these instruments. It has been reshaped by the many changes that have taken place, such as
deregulation, liberalization, and technological advances. Two type of ﬁrms largely dominate the industry,
namely, private commercial banks and savings banks. The latter has been the most successful in gaining
market. It was also subject to the tightest regulation, and hence, deregulation initiatives may have aﬀected
this group more profoundly. For these reasons, among others, they warrant our attention. Speciﬁcally,
our attempt is to analyze the eﬃciency and productivity of Spanish savings banks over the 1992–1998
post-deregulation period, and provide statistical precision to our results using the sensitivity analysis in
Simar and Wilson (1998).
This application is important for several reasons. Firstly, although Simar and Wilson’s methodology
is powerful, there is a lack of empirical applications which use their bootstrap techniques.3 Second, the
study of the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial institutions has hardly considered this topic, although it clearly provides
a measure of statistical precision for DEA. One exception is the study by Ferrier and Hirschberg (1997),
who attempted to allow for random error in DEA in an application with Italian banking data, which
focused exclusively on eﬃciency. Another is the work of Gilbert and Wilson (1998), which examines
the productivity angle. Third, we improve (very) slightly previous approaches to bootstrapping DEA
results by applying a more hi-tech method for bandwidth selection—as we will deal with nonparametric
estimation of eﬃciency scores’ densities.
A number of studies have focused on the performance of Spanish savings banks during the deregulatory
period. They vary a great deal in their conclusions, because of diﬀerent techniques used to measure
eﬃciency, diﬀerent measures and deﬁnitions of inputs and outputs, diﬀerent samples, or simply diﬀerent
attempts. However, on the statistical signiﬁcance of eﬃciency diﬀerences, the empirical evidence still has
to come.
Our attempts are not exclusively conﬁned to conferring statistical precision to eﬃciency scores. Ad-
ditionally, and complementarily, we analyze productivity change over the sample period. For this, we
consider nonparametric techniques (Grosskopf, 1993) which again involve the estimation of productivity
change which disregards statistical signiﬁcance. Put other way, we do not know whether certain ﬁrm’s
productivity growth, or decline, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. Simar and Wilson (1999a) provide an
appropriate tool to achieve this, which is diﬀerent from that provided in Simar and Wilson (1998) for
eﬃciency scores, but complementary.
In this case, the application to Spanish savings banks over the 1992–1998 period turns out to be even
2Other earlier attempts to use resampling in the general context of nonparametric eﬃciency measurement include F¨ are
and Whittaker (1995), F¨ are et al. (1989), Grosskopf and Yaisawarng (1990), or Ferrier et al. (1993).
3A recent application, although in a very diﬀerent setting, is that by Gonz´ alez and Miles (2002).more interesting. The research studies focusing on these questions are thinner on the ground. Among these
are studies by Pastor (1995) and Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell (1996), which analyze the productivity of savings
banks, although the former extends the analysis to commercial banks. Our study complements theirs in
several ways. Firstly, whilst they focus on the deregulation period (1987–1992 and 1986–1991, respectively)
our work focuses on the post-deregulation period,4 in which the wave of merger and acquisitions (M&As)
had almost come to an end. Hence, from a dynamic point of view, it turns out to be a fascinating period
to study, as we have nearly the same number of ﬁrms at every period. In addition, this constitutes an
important prerequisite when measuring productivity change, as panel data are required. Furthermore,
our output deﬁnition accounts for business lines in which savings banks might have specialized over the
deregulation period. Yet analogously to what happens to eﬃciency scores, our main contribution consists
of conferring statistical signiﬁcance to the results. In addition, we should bear in mind that deregulation
took place during diﬀerent periods. As Danthine et al. (1999) point out, the deregulation in the 1980s
occurred at national levels as well as through EU-wide measures, whereas from the late 1980s and going
into the 1990s the EU started to harmonize bank regulation.5
The article proceeds as follows. After this introductory section, section 2 presents the methodology to
measure both eﬃciency and productivity indices, while section 3 is devoted both to motivate and brieﬂy
explain bootstrapping techniques as applied to DEA. Section 4 provides data information, and section 5
presents and discusses the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Measuring the eﬃciency and productivity of savings banks
Nonparametric frontier techniques are used to measure both the eﬃciency and productivity of savings
banks. We ﬁrstly present the details on the measurement of productivity and secondly examine how
to measure eﬃciency. We chose to proceed in this way because the measurement of technical eﬃciency
through nonparametric techniques is founded on the estimation of distance functions, analogously to
productivity indices.
Productivity can be measured via either parametric and nonparametric methods. Within both ap-
proaches may be found those which ignore eﬃciency, as opposed to others which account for it. Grosskopf
(1993) provides an excellent survey on this topic. We focus on nonparametric methods which account
for ineﬃciency or, in other words, nonparametric frontier approaches. These have been widely used since
the early eighties, after the inﬂuential works by Caves et al. (1982), which developed the Malmquist pro-
ductivity index from the notion of “proportional scaling” introduced by Malmquist (1953). Caves et al.
(1982) did not account for ineﬃciency, contrary to F¨ are et al. (1992), who combine ideas on measurement
of eﬃciency from Farrell (1957) and on measurement of productivity from Caves et al. (1982) to develop
a Malmquist index of productivity change.
To measure productivity growth we consider two periods, t1 and t2. In period t1 ﬁrms produce output
yt1 by using input xt1, whereas in period t2 quantities are yt2 and xt2, respectively. The production set
4All important deregulation initiatives took place before 1991. The only remaining change was the establishment of the
Single European Market in 1993.
5For a recent overview of bank regulation and deregulation, see Freixas and Santomero (2002).St which models the transformation of inputs xt ∈ RN
+ into outputs yt ∈ RM
+ at time t is:
St = {(xt,yt):xt can produce yt} (1)
which holds for t1 and t2.




















i ) is the vector in RN+M made up of ﬁrm i’s inputs and outputs, and the quotient in the
vector y
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i ). Equation (2) refers to
the output distance function, and is simply the inverse of the Farrell (1957) output-oriented measure of
technical eﬃciency. Note that Dt
i(xt
i,yt
i) ≤ 1 if and only if (xt
i,yt
i) ∈S t, which holds for both t1 and t2.
Computing the Malmquist productivity index requires two additional distance functions to be deﬁned.
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which is the geometric mean of the output-based Malmquist productivity indices for t1 and t2 deﬁned
by Caves et al. (1982). Alternatively, F¨ are et al. (1992) decompose (5) into the product of an index
measuring changes in technical eﬃciency (“catching up”) and another one capturing the shift in the



























































The eﬃciency change component is an index of relative technical eﬃciency change, and shows how
much closer (or farther away) a ﬁrm gets to the frontier made up by “best practice” ﬁrms. This component
is greater than, equal to, or less than unity depending on whether the evaluated ﬁrm improves, stagna-
tes, or declines. The technical change component measures how much the frontier shifts, and indicateswhether the best practice relative to which the evaluated ﬁrm is compared is improving, stagnating, or
deteriorating. In either case the index will take a value greater than, equal to, or less than unity—hence
technical change is positive, zero, or negative.
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+ is its output reciprocal.
Following F¨ are et al. (1992) the four components which make up equation (6) via linear programming





































L)  is a vector of weights that forms a convex combination of observed ﬁrms













i ) is exactly like (8), where t2 is substituted for t1.
Two further linear programs are needed to estimate the mixed-period cases (3) and (4). The ﬁrst of




























i ≥ 0,i =1 ,...,L.
(9)
As F¨ are et al. (1994) state, observations involved in (9) are from both period t1 and t2. The reference




i ) is evaluated is constructed from observations in t1. To calculate






i ), the t1 and t2 superscripts in (9) must simply be
reversed. Hereafter, and for the sake of simplicity, the distances involved in these four linear programs
will be labelled ˆ D
t1|t1
i , ˆ D
t2|t2
i , ˆ D
t2|t1
i and ˆ D
t1|t2
i , respectively.
Unlike other recent work (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999; Mukherjee et al., 2001), in which a further
decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index is considered, we assume constant returns to scale
(CRS), which is a common assumption, since Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell (1995b) have shown that in the
context of non-constant returns to scale, the Malmquist index does not accurately measure productivity
change. In the case of Spanish savings banks, it is not a substantial assumption, since some appliedpapers have found results of constant returns to scale or very close to them (Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell,
1995a; Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell, 1997; Raymond and Garc´ ıa Greciano, 1994). In addition, assuming CRS
allows a more direct comparison between our results and those by Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell (1996) and
Pastor (1995). A further advantage of CRS is that results are coincidental regardless of whether we solve
the linear programs under the input- or output-oriented approaches.
For eﬃciency measurement no additional formulation is needed. The distances involved in its compu-
tation have been already presented. Speciﬁcally, to measure the technical eﬃciency of a given Decision
Making Unit, DMU, (savings bank) in period t1 we would simply have to solve the inverse of (8). The
same holds for measuring the eﬃciency of a given ﬁrm in period t2, in which case we should consider the
inverse of (8), replacing t1 with t2.
The interpretation is straightforward. Clearly, ˆ D
t|t
i ≤ 1, with ˆ D
t|t
i = 1 indicating that the ith ﬁrm
lies on the boundary of the production set and is thus technically eﬃcient. The other ﬁrms with scores
below unity will be technically ineﬃcient, producing less output at given input levels. For simplicity, when
referring to eﬃciency scores and eﬃciency measurement, ˆ D
t|t
i will be labelled ˆ θi.
3. Formulation of the bootstrap
The presentation of the bootstrapping methodology closely follows that of Simar and Wilson (1998,
1999a). As will be emphasized throughout the presentation, the biggest problem when bootstrapping
both productivity indices and eﬃciency scores is that of mimicking the DGP to allow the introduction
of probability elements into the problem. Some previous applications of this methodology have failed in
this attempt, hence providing inconsistent bootstrap estimation.6 Consequently, our basic attempt here
is to apply the bootstrapping techniques introduced earlier by Efron (1979) and Efron and Tibshirani
(1993), but with explicit care over the very particular DGP of both the Malmquist productivity indices
and eﬃciency scores. In other words, we will not apply the so-called naive bootstrap, which consists of
merely resampling from the original data, but rather we will consider the distributions underlying such
distance functions.
An example is provided in ﬁgure 1. It shows the density functions (estimated nonparametrically
using kernel smoothing) of technical eﬃciency scores for each sample period. The features revealed are
manifold but, for our purposes, it must be noted that their shape is very peculiar. Speciﬁcally, in all
cases a remarkable mode is observed at above unity. Furthermore, we must consider that, given that
eﬃciency scores are bounded from above, there is no probability mass beyond 1. Silverman (1986)
developed an interesting statistical procedure, the reﬂection method, to account for this. When using
it to nonparametrically estimate density functions, results are satisfactory, as ﬁgure revealed in 2. If all
these features are not taken into account when mimicking the DGP, inconsistent bootstrap estimation is
likely to occur.7 Also, it is interesting to note that eﬃciency scores approach over time, as density is much
more concentrated in 1998 than it is in 1992, whether we use the reﬂection method or not. However, a
6For an illustration, see the debate in Lovell (2000), Ferrier and Hirschberg (1997, 1999), and Simar and Wilson (1999b,c).


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.substantial amount of ineﬃciency still persists.
3.1. Bootstrapping productivity indices
Thus, our basic aim when bootstrapping the Malmquist productivity index is to replicate the DGP, so as to









and to apply the original estimators to these pseudo samples, i.e., we have to consider the bootstrap
counterparts of programs (8) and (9), along with their reversals—i.e., we would have four linear programs.

























in ,n =1 ,...,N,
λ
t1
i ≥ 0,i =1 ,...,L.
(10)
The bootstrap counterparts of the remaining programs are derived quite straightforwardly. For period
t2 we simply have to substitute t1∗ with t2∗.

























in ,n =1 ,...,N,
λ
t1
i ≥ 0,i =1 ,...,L,
(11)
The fourth program, corresponding to the other mixed-period case, arises from reversing t1∗ and t2∗
in (11).
Again, for simplicity, the solutions to these four programs will hereafter be labelled ˆ D
t1|t1∗





i and ˆ D
t1|t2∗
i , respectively. Therefore, for each ﬁrm, and each two time periods t1,t 2 we have
{ ˆ D
t1|t1∗
i (b), ˆ D
t2|t2∗
i (b), ˆ D
t2|t1∗
i (b), ˆ D
t1|t2∗
i (b)}B
b=1, which can be easily substituted in (6) to construct boots-
trap estimates of eﬃciency change, technical change, and Malmquist productivity indices.
The important point after computing these bootstrap estimates is to be able to construct conﬁdence
intervals at desired levels of signiﬁcance. It is thus possible to assert whether productivity growth (or
decline) measured by the Malmquist productivity index is signiﬁcant, i.e., it is greater than (or less than)
unity at the desired signiﬁcance levels.8 The same holds for the sources of productivity, as assessing the
signiﬁcance of both eﬃciency change and technical change—if they occur—is now possible.
Therefore, our aim is to perform statistical inference using the bootstrap or, put another way, to
make inferences about the Malmquist index for each ﬁrm by approximating the sampling distribution
8Obviously, the interpretation would be the opposite if the input-oriented case were considered. In such a case, produc-
tivity decline would be indicated by a Malmquist productivity index greater than unity.of its estimator, hereafter labelled ˆ Mi(t1,t 2). Two complementary ways of doing this are through the
development of an estimate of the bias9 and through the development of conﬁdence intervals. Our attention
will be entirely conﬁned to the latter.10
To estimate conﬁdence intervals, we take into account that the bootstrap is based on the approximation
of the unknown distribution ˆ Mi(t1,t 2)−Mi(t1,t 2) by the distribution ˆ M∗
i (t1,t 2)− ˆ Mi(t1,t 2) conditioned
on the original data—where ˆ M∗
i (t1,t 2) is the bootstrap estimator of the Malmquist productivity index
for ﬁrm i. If we knew the former distribution, then it would be trivial to ﬁnd values aα and bα such that:
Prob(−bα ≤ ˆ Mi(t1,t 2) − Mi(t1,t 2) ≤− aα)=1− α, (12)
for the usual conﬁdence levels (α =0 .10, α =0 .05). Unfortunately, this distribution is unknown. Instead,
the bootstrap values { ˆ M∗
i (t1,t 2)(b)}B
b=1 to generate conﬁdence intervals:
Prob(−b∗
α ≤ ˆ M∗
i (t1,t 2) − ˆ Mi(t1,t 2) ≤− a∗
α|Z)=1− α (13)
Also, as it is true that when B →∞
[ ˆ Mi(t1,t 2) − Mi(t1,t 2)]
approx
∼ [ ˆ M∗
i (t1,t 2) − ˆ Mi(t1,t 2)]|Z (14)
we may conclude that
Prob(−b∗
α ≤ ˆ Mi(t1,t 2) − Mi(t1,t 2) ≤− a∗
α|Z) ≈ 1 − α (15)
It can easily be seen that the point is to ﬁnd appropriate a∗
α and b∗
α values. This may be accomplished
through mechanical sorting of the values [ ˆ M∗
i (t1,t 2)(b)− ˆ Mi(t1,t 2)],b=1 ,...,Bby algebraic value, then
deleting ((α/2)×100)-percent of the elements at either end, and ﬁnally setting −b∗
α and −a∗
α equal to the
extreme parts of the resulting sorted array, meeting the condition a∗
α ≤ b∗
α. This method is known as the
percentile method.
Once both values have been obtained, by rearranging terms in (15) we obtain:
ˆ Mi(t1,t 2)+a∗
α ≤ Mi(t1,t 2) ≤ ˆ Mi(t1,t 2)+b∗
α (16)
which is a (1 − α)% conﬁdence interval indicating that productivity growth, or productivity decline,
has occurred at a signiﬁcant level if the interval does not include unity. On the contrary, if the interval
included the unity we would conclude that there has been no productivity change (either growth or decline)
for ﬁrm i,e v e ni ft h eoriginal Malmquist productivity index were diﬀerent from one—i.e., productivity
growth, or decline, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity.
The procedure outlined above would yield inconsistent bootstrap estimates unless we replicated the
9The rationale for this is provided by Mooney and Duval (1993).
10Simar and Wilson (1999a) provide such an estimate of the bias for the Malmquist productivity index .DGP consistently. This task is of great relevance in our speciﬁc setting, in which data generated by
distance functions are bounded. Speciﬁcally, employing the empirical distribution would yield inconsistent
estimates, as it places a positive probability mass at the boundary of the estimated production set, which
does not vanish as L →∞ .
In order to overcome this problem, and following Simar and Wilson (1999a), we may attempt to
estimate the density of the original distance function estimates, and then draw from this density to
construct pseudo samples Z∗. As we closely follow Simar and Wilson (1999a), all details have been
omitted for brevity.
3.2. Bootstrapping eﬃciency scores
Measuring eﬃciency does not require panel data. Our attention is conﬁned to (10)—or its t2 version.
This implies that the DGP is now diﬀerent. In particular, and keeping in mind the smoothed version of
the bootstrap that we are considering, our ﬁrst interest is now how to make inference, once we have a
large bootstrap sample {ˆ θ∗
ib}B
b=1.
As the bootstrap is based on the idea that if we have a reasonable (consistent) estimator of the DGP,
the bootstrap distribution will mimic the original sampling distribution of the estimators of interest, then
we can estimate the bias of each estimation ˆ θi using the bootstrap sample as
 biasi = ¯ θ∗






ib. We can then obtain a bias corrected estimator for θi as:
˜ θi =2ˆ θi − ¯ θ∗
i (18)
Moreover, the empirical distribution of {ˆ θ∗
ib}B
b=1 provides, after correction for bias, conﬁdence intervals
for ˆ θi:
(ˆ θi,low, ˆ θi,up)=(˜ θ
∗(α)





i is the 100 αth percentile of the empirical distribution of the corrected for bias distribution
denoted by {˜ θ∗
ib}B
b=1.
It is worth noting that if this distribution is skewed, we can use also median-bias corrected conﬁ-
dence intervals.11 As in the Malmquist productivity index case, all details regarding the DGP follow the
contribution by Simar and Wilson (1998), and consequently have been omitted for reasons of space.
11See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and Simar and Wilson (1998) for details.4. Data
4.1. The sample
Data are provided by the Spanish savings banks association (CECA, Confederaci´ on Espa˜ nola de Cajas
de Ahorro). The ﬁrms which were not in continuous existence over the sample period 1992–1998 were
dropped, and savings banks were backward merged in order to have the same number of ﬁrms in every
year. Although this might a priori involve both losing information and creating artiﬁcial companies,
neither of these two cases occurs. First, virtually all ﬁrms were in continuous existence over the sample
period. Second, the only ﬁrms which were not were those involved in M&A’s. However, the consolidation
process was nearly over in 1992. Since then, there have been only three consolidations, which aﬀected
only small ﬁrms. Hence, in order to include all ﬁrms, and to obtain a complete panel, we judged it a
reasonable strategy to backward merge these ﬁrms. Two of these consolidations took place in 1992, and
the third occurred in 1994.12
4.2. Inputs and outputs
Our way of measuring the ﬂow of services provided by savings banks follows the intermediation approach,
which considers ﬁrms as primarily intermediating funds between savers and investors, in contrast to
the production approach, which treats ﬁnancial institutions as primarily producing services for account
holders. A diﬀerent issue, often confused with the former, refers to the deﬁnition of outputs (Tortosa-
Ausina, 2002a). The asset, user cost, and value-added methods are three diﬀerent ways of assigning input
or output nature to the diﬀerent balance sheet categories. They diﬀer, among other aspects, in the role
attached to deposits. Our approach is in line with the asset approach, as it primarily treats earning assets
as bank output. However, it is generally accepted that most banks raise a substantial portion of their
funds through produced deposits and provide liquidity, payments, and safekeeping services to depositors
to obtain these funds. In order to capture these activities, we have included core deposits as an additional
output category—hence, our approach will be closer to the value-added approach. In addition, in line
with the contributions by Rogers (1998) and Rogers and Sinkey Jr (1999), and with the European Central
Bank (2000), we consider an additional output to control for the nontraditional activities performed by
banks. All variables are described in table 1, which also reports descriptive statistics.
Therefore, our choice considers three outputs and three inputs. Our ﬁrst output category is loans
(y1), deﬁned as all forms of loans performed by savings banks. This is virtually the only asset category
unanimously treated as bank output by the diﬀerent output deﬁnitions. It would be desirable to disag-
gregate it, but the lack of precise statistical information rules out this possibility. The second output
is savings, time, and transactions deposits (y2). Ideally, this category should include only transactions
deposits, given that our purpose is to proxy the liquidity, payments, and safekeeping services provided.
Unfortunately, public information only disentangles savings deposits, other deposits, and interbank depo-
sits. We label this category as “core” deposits, following Kumbhakar et al. (2001). Finally, we followed



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.some recent contributions which claim the “decline” of traditional banking (Gorton and Rosen, 1995), and
others which, following these ideas, suggest that a proxy should be included to account for nontraditional
activities (Rogers, 1998; Rogers and Sinkey Jr, 1999). Hence, our third output category (y3) includes
mainly noninterest income, following Rogers (1998). The rationale for this also comes from the increase
in mutual funds to the detriment of deposits which occurred during the sample years. Additionally, we
included the income from securities in this category, as many savings banks took part in the privatiza-
tion process of certain public companies which occurred in the latter years of the sample, given that less
regulated-conditioned output mixes could be chosen.
In the case of the inputs, the consensus in the literature is far broader. We include two traditional
inputs, labour (x1) and capital (x2), measured by total labour expenses and physical capital, respectively.
We also include purchased funds (x3), including all deposits categories, since this category generates
roughly two thirds of total bank costs (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002b).
5. Assessing eﬃciency and productivity diﬀerences: cross-section and time
disparities
5.1. Productivity growth
Changes in eﬃciency, technology, and productivity are reported in tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively, for
both pairs of consecutive years and the sub-periods 1992–1995, 1995–1998 and the whole sample period
1992–1998. The last row in each table reports the mean for each selected pair of years.13 Although the
exposition, and computation, was performed in terms of input-oriented indices, the reciprocal (output-
oriented) was considered to disclose results for ease of interpretation. Accordingly, values above unity
indicate improvement in productivity, eﬃciency, or technical change between periods t1 and t2, and vice
versa.
Table 4 suggests that by 1998 savings banks were providing, on average, 119% as much output per unit
of input as in 1992. In no year does the mean of the savings banks Malmquist productivity index equal,
or is below unity. Productivity growth is especially high during the 1995/98 period, in which the rate
of productivity growth was 11.56%, due to increases in periods 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98 of 1.86%,
3.72% and 4.81%, respectively. In the initial post-deregulation years, productivity growth also existed,
although the gains occurred at more modest rates—in 1994/95 the increase was of 0.26%.
Suitable explanations for these trends come from the decomposition of the Malmquist productivity
index. The last row in table 3 reveals that productivity growth is attributable to a great extent to an
improvement in “best practice” or, in other words, in production possibilities. An accurate examination of
those ﬁgures in the last row of both tables 3 and 4 discloses that they are quite similar in periods 1996/97,
1997/98 and 1992/95. On the other hand, the last row in table 2 suggests that catching up with “best
practice” improved productivity, although at far more modest rates. Speciﬁcally, eﬃciency improvements
13In the case of the mean, signiﬁcance was determined by appealing to the central limit theorem, which requires indepen-
dence among the eﬃciency estimates Wheelock and Wilson (1999). Given the inherent dependency of DEA eﬃciency scores,
the indicated signiﬁcance is at best only.Table 2: Changes in eﬃciency, consecutive years and sub-periods
Firm 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1992/95 1995/98 1992/98
1 0.8626∗∗ 1.0663∗∗ 0.9578∗∗ 1.0358∗∗ 1.0057 1.0683∗∗ 0.8809∗∗ 1.1128∗∗ 0.9803
2 1.0046 0.9651∗∗ 0.9960 1.0336∗∗ 1.0243∗∗ 1.0102 0.9658∗∗ 1.0695∗∗ 1.0329
3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
4 0.9993 0.9527∗∗ 1.0424∗∗ 0.9941 1.0289∗∗ 1.0663∗∗ 0.9924 1.0907∗∗ 1.0824∗∗
5 1.1283∗∗ 1.0264 0.9763 1.0491∗∗ 0.9991 0.9121∗∗ 1.1305∗∗ 0.9561∗∗ 1.0809∗∗
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
7 1.0492∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0492∗∗ 1.0000 1.0492∗∗
8 0.9398∗∗ 1.0464∗∗ 0.9910 1.0272∗∗ 0.9958 1.0708∗∗ 0.9745 1.0954∗∗ 1.0674∗∗
9 1.0061 1.0356∗ 0.9806 1.0062 1.0000 1.0135 1.0218 1.0198 1.0420∗
10 1.0130 0.9399∗∗ 1.0509∗∗ 1.0752∗∗ 0.9547∗∗ 0.9835∗ 1.0006 1.0095 1.0101
11 1.0000 0.9213∗∗ 0.9975 1.0397∗∗ 1.0305∗∗ 0.9652∗∗ 0.9191∗∗ 1.0341∗ 0.9504∗∗
12 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9289∗∗ 0.9568∗∗ 1.0000 0.8889∗∗ 0.8889∗∗
13 1.0852∗∗ 0.8872∗∗ 1.0441∗∗ 0.9469∗∗ 0.9772∗∗ 0.9750∗∗ 1.0052 0.9022∗∗ 0.9068∗∗
14 1.0405∗∗ 1.0536∗∗ 0.9267∗∗ 1.0789∗∗ 1.0394∗∗ 0.9609∗∗ 1.0160 1.0775∗∗ 1.0947∗∗
15 1.0438∗∗ 1.0074 1.0549∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.1092∗∗ 1.0000 1.1092∗∗
16 1.0348∗∗ 0.9777∗∗ 1.0195 1.0206∗ 1.0263∗∗ 1.0194∗ 1.0314 1.0678∗∗ 1.1013∗∗
17 0.9825 0.9701∗∗ 0.9956 0.9835∗ 1.0184 1.0083 0.9490∗∗ 1.0099 0.9583∗∗
18 0.9988 1.2497∗∗ 0.9211∗∗ 0.9471∗∗ 1.1316∗∗ 1.0077 1.1497∗∗ 1.0799∗∗ 1.2416∗∗
19 1.0471∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0472∗∗ 1.0000 1.0472∗∗
20 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9995∗∗ 1.0005∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
21 1.0050 1.0600∗∗ 0.9302∗∗ 1.0238∗ 1.0040 1.0423∗∗ 0.9910 1.0713∗∗ 1.0618∗∗
22 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9889 0.9171∗∗ 1.0000 0.9069∗∗ 0.9069∗∗
23 0.9414∗∗ 1.0794∗∗ 0.8624∗∗ 1.1465∗∗ 1.0761∗∗ 0.9994 0.8764∗∗ 1.2330∗∗ 1.0805∗∗
24 0.9476∗∗ 1.0229 1.0081 1.0608∗∗ 0.9690∗∗ 1.0532∗∗ 0.9771 1.0826∗∗ 1.0579∗∗
25 0.9655∗∗ 0.9681∗∗ 1.1569∗∗ 0.9752 0.9567∗∗ 1.0358∗∗ 1.0813∗∗ 0.9664∗ 1.0450∗∗
26 0.9576∗∗ 1.0080 1.0808∗∗ 1.0443∗∗ 1.0000 0.9952 1.0432∗∗ 1.0393∗∗ 1.0843∗∗
27 1.0000 1.0000 0.9728 0.9837∗ 0.9957 1.0496∗∗ 0.9728 1.0280 1.0000
28 1.0025 1.0209 0.9302∗∗ 1.0181∗ 1.0515∗∗ 1.0373∗∗ 0.9520∗∗ 1.1106∗∗ 1.0573∗∗
29 1.0000 0.9955 0.9727∗ 1.0326∗∗ 1.0000 0.9982 0.9684 1.0308∗ 0.9982
30 1.0361∗∗ 1.0410∗∗ 1.0679∗∗ 0.9933 0.9317∗∗ 1.0221∗ 1.1517∗∗ 0.9459∗∗ 1.0894∗∗
31 1.0003 1.0031 1.0602∗∗ 1.0685∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0639∗∗ 1.0685∗∗ 1.1367∗∗
32 0.9761 1.0578∗∗ 0.9969 1.0030 1.0000 0.9659∗∗ 1.0293∗ 0.9688∗∗ 0.9972
33 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
34 0.9976 0.9746∗ 0.9975 1.0239∗ 1.0073 1.0000 0.9697 1.0312 1.0000
35 0.9949 1.0192 0.9239∗∗ 0.9671∗∗ 0.9510∗∗ 1.0122 0.9369∗∗ 0.9310∗∗ 0.8723∗∗
36 0.9751 1.0531∗∗ 1.0341∗∗ 1.0634∗∗ 0.9653∗∗ 0.9930 1.0619∗∗ 1.0194 1.0825∗∗
37 0.9545∗∗ 1.0377∗∗ 1.0410∗∗ 1.0211∗ 1.0583∗∗ 0.9376∗∗ 1.0310 1.0132 1.0446∗
38 0.9630∗∗ 0.9979 1.0135 1.0156 1.0420∗∗ 0.9505∗∗ 0.9740∗ 1.0068 0.9806
39 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9982 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
40 0.8728∗∗ 1.0461∗∗ 0.9310∗∗ 1.0172 1.0676∗∗ 1.0676∗∗ 0.8500∗∗ 1.1593∗∗ 0.9854
41 0.9084∗∗ 1.0646∗∗ 1.0161 0.9469∗∗ 0.9751∗∗ 1.0130 0.9826 0.9354∗∗ 0.9191∗∗
42 1.0300 0.9792 1.0073 1.0138 0.9504∗∗ 0.9730∗∗ 1.0160 0.9375∗∗ 0.9525∗∗
43 1.0000 0.9805 0.9921 0.9919 0.9652∗∗ 1.0740∗∗ 0.9727 1.0281∗ 1.0000
44 1.0182∗ 0.9433∗∗ 0.9536∗∗ 1.0337∗∗ 0.9901 1.0271∗∗ 0.9158∗∗ 1.0512∗∗ 0.9628∗∗
45 0.9951 1.0678∗∗ 1.1018∗∗ 0.9832 1.0081 1.0089 1.1708∗∗ 1.0000 1.1708∗∗
46 1.0244∗ 1.0379∗∗ 1.0075 1.0493∗∗ 0.9876 0.9977 1.0712∗∗ 1.0339∗ 1.1076∗∗
47 0.9782∗ 0.9961 0.9753 0.9322∗∗ 1.0193 1.0351∗∗ 0.9503∗∗ 0.9835 0.9346∗∗
48 1.0000 1.0000 0.8955∗∗ 0.9827 1.0025 1.0115 0.8955∗∗ 0.9964 0.8923∗∗
49 0.9285∗∗ 1.0414∗∗ 1.0458∗∗ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0113 1.0000 1.0113
50 1.0675∗∗ 1.0224∗ 0.9409∗∗ 1.0403∗∗ 1.0338∗∗ 1.0000 1.0269 1.0755∗∗ 1.1044∗∗
Mean 0.9944 1.0111 0.9960 1.0127∗∗ 1.0025 1.0040 1.0015 1.0194∗∗ 1.0209∗∗
(∗), (∗∗): signiﬁcant diﬀerences from unity at 10% and 5%, respectively. In the case of the mean, signiﬁcance
was determined by appealing to the central limit theorem.Table 3: Changes in technology, consecutive years and sub-periods
Firm 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1992/95 1995/98 1992/98
1 1.0368∗∗ 1.0172 1.0390∗∗ 0.9699∗∗ 1.0092 1.0379∗∗ 1.1094∗∗ 1.0671∗∗ 1.1162∗∗
2 1.0446∗∗ 1.0069 1.0081 0.9810∗∗ 1.0085 1.0161∗∗ 1.0630∗∗ 1.0097 1.0410∗∗
3 1.0951∗∗ 1.0510 1.0187 1.1203∗∗ 1.1320∗∗ 1.0585∗∗ 1.2005∗∗ 1.3209∗∗ 1.5479∗∗
4 0.9888 1.0158 0.9880 1.0119 1.0336∗∗ 1.0777∗∗ 1.0164 1.1475∗∗ 1.3778∗∗
5 0.9987 0.9814 0.9802∗ 1.0251 1.0890∗∗ 1.0921∗∗ 0.9671∗∗ 1.2247∗∗ 1.2960∗∗
6 1.0316 0.9842 0.9509∗ 0.9655∗ 1.0094 1.0087 0.9653 1.0024 1.0640∗∗
7 1.0356∗∗ 1.1051∗∗ 1.0452∗ 1.0027 1.0583∗∗ 1.1459∗∗ 1.1606∗∗ 1.2508∗∗ 1.4312∗∗
8 1.0399∗∗ 1.0042 1.0024 1.0135 1.0191∗ 1.0280∗∗ 1.0072 1.0631∗∗ 1.0903∗∗
9 1.0432∗∗ 1.0137 0.9805 1.0129 1.0180 1.0954∗∗ 1.0750∗∗ 1.2028∗∗ 1.2225∗∗
10 1.0433∗∗ 1.0143∗ 1.0151∗∗ 0.9693∗∗ 1.0026 1.0080 1.0746∗∗ 0.9906 1.0347∗∗
11 1.0363∗∗ 1.0124 1.0152 0.9607∗∗ 0.9963 1.0321∗∗ 1.0642∗∗ 1.0114 1.0128
12 1.0481∗∗ 0.9276∗∗ 1.0236∗∗ 0.9817∗∗ 1.0572∗∗ 1.0444∗∗ 0.9946 1.0750∗∗ 1.1247∗∗
13 1.0479∗∗ 1.0205 0.9716∗∗ 0.9982 1.0136∗∗ 1.0325∗∗ 1.0364∗∗ 1.0876∗∗ 1.0874∗∗
14 1.0570∗∗ 1.0487∗∗ 1.0446∗∗ 0.9675∗∗ 1.0450∗∗ 1.0606∗∗ 1.0749∗∗ 1.0532∗∗ 1.1465∗∗
15 1.0088 1.0249∗∗ 1.0245∗∗ 0.9848 1.0805∗∗ 1.0960∗∗ 1.0431∗∗ 1.1475∗∗ 1.1853∗∗
16 1.0460∗∗ 0.9846∗ 1.0000 0.9758∗∗ 1.0184∗∗ 1.0275∗∗ 1.0301∗∗ 1.0073 0.9939
17 1.0354∗∗ 1.0141∗ 1.0050 0.9931 1.0005 1.0109 1.0592∗∗ 0.9971 1.0682∗∗
18 1.0075 1.0029 1.0137 1.0465∗∗ 1.0391∗∗ 1.0879∗∗ 1.0129 1.2428∗∗ 1.3469∗∗
19 1.0342∗∗ 0.9557∗∗ 0.9780 1.0205∗∗ 1.0136 1.0293∗∗ 0.9520∗∗ 1.0823∗∗ 1.0699∗∗
20 1.0478∗∗ 1.0032 1.0660∗∗ 0.9673∗ 0.9903 0.9465∗∗ 1.1385∗∗ 0.9511∗∗ 1.0397
21 1.0220∗∗ 0.9735∗∗ 0.9982 1.0118 1.0170 1.0394∗∗ 0.9999 1.0744∗∗ 1.0990∗∗
22 1.0590∗∗ 0.9811 0.9710 1.0108 1.0454 1.0908∗∗ 1.0427 1.1703∗∗ 1.3416∗∗
23 1.1334∗∗ 0.9047∗∗ 1.0347∗∗ 0.9703∗∗ 1.0143 1.0513∗∗ 1.0423∗ 1.0406∗∗ 1.0748∗∗
24 1.0263∗ 1.0171∗ 1.0235∗∗ 1.0031 1.0702∗∗ 1.0749∗∗ 1.1031∗∗ 1.0946∗∗ 1.3559∗∗
25 0.9984 1.0002 1.0376∗∗ 1.0221 1.0431∗∗ 1.0675∗∗ 1.0838∗∗ 1.1775∗∗ 1.3381∗∗
26 1.0248∗∗ 1.0056 1.0009 0.9936 1.0418∗∗ 1.0260 1.0040 1.0774∗∗ 1.1229∗∗
27 0.9932 0.9748∗ 0.9470∗∗ 1.0177 1.0232∗∗ 1.0212∗∗ 0.9122∗∗ 1.0681∗∗ 1.0500
28 1.0578∗∗ 1.0540∗∗ 1.0789∗∗ 0.9782 1.0114 1.0244∗∗ 1.1899∗∗ 0.9968 1.1863∗∗
29 1.0342∗∗ 1.0000 0.9946 0.9815∗∗ 1.0163∗ 1.0155 1.0261 1.0302∗∗ 1.0795∗∗
30 1.0471∗∗ 1.0038 1.0050 1.0151 1.0242∗∗ 1.0347∗∗ 1.0210∗∗ 1.0996∗∗ 1.1174∗∗
31 1.0446∗∗ 0.9640∗∗ 0.9726∗∗ 1.0784∗∗ 1.0470∗∗ 1.0257 0.9765∗∗ 1.1415∗∗ 1.1268∗∗
32 1.0064 1.0349∗∗ 0.9836∗ 1.0647∗∗ 1.0193 1.0408∗∗ 1.0205 1.1403∗∗ 1.2028∗∗
33 1.3115∗∗ 0.9969 1.0468∗ 1.0806∗∗ 1.0589∗∗ 1.1296∗∗ 1.5049∗∗ 1.2945∗∗ 1.7527∗∗
34 1.0557∗∗ 1.0092 1.0093 1.0012 1.0755∗∗ 0.9955 1.0888∗∗ 1.0538∗∗ 1.0900∗∗
35 1.0531∗∗ 0.9517∗∗ 1.0155 0.9673∗∗ 1.0028 1.0187∗∗ 0.9702∗ 0.9890 0.9835∗
36 1.0167 1.0096 1.0138 1.0059 1.0431∗∗ 1.0491∗∗ 1.0390∗∗ 1.1183∗∗ 1.2233∗∗
37 1.0487∗∗ 1.0136 0.9626∗∗ 0.9947 1.0533∗∗ 1.0503∗∗ 0.9962 1.1024∗∗ 1.1349∗∗
38 1.0494∗∗ 0.9970 1.0054 0.9591∗∗ 1.0476∗∗ 0.9942 1.0342∗∗ 1.0278∗∗ 1.0360∗∗
39 1.0332∗ 1.0082 0.9919 1.0511∗∗ 1.0232 0.9940 1.0379∗∗ 1.0656∗∗ 1.2206∗∗
40 1.0571∗∗ 1.0103 1.0043 0.9773∗∗ 1.0152∗∗ 1.0274∗∗ 1.0742∗∗ 1.0638∗∗ 1.1178∗∗
41 1.0533∗∗ 0.9542∗∗ 0.9985 0.9933 1.0142 1.0478∗∗ 1.0058 1.0587∗∗ 1.0741∗∗
42 1.1152∗∗ 0.9795∗∗ 1.0534∗∗ 0.9876 1.0634∗∗ 1.0382∗∗ 1.1475∗∗ 1.0577∗∗ 1.1736∗∗
43 0.9876 1.0315 0.9877 1.0512∗∗ 1.0565∗∗ 1.0703∗∗ 1.0962∗∗ 1.1731∗∗ 1.2807∗∗
44 1.0309∗∗ 1.0143∗∗ 0.9954 0.9866 1.0138 1.0203∗∗ 1.0357∗∗ 1.0478∗∗ 1.0563∗∗
45 1.0322∗∗ 0.9830∗∗ 1.0086 1.0824∗∗ 1.0755∗∗ 1.0621∗∗ 1.0069 1.1707∗∗ 1.3474∗∗
46 1.0423∗∗ 0.9849∗∗ 1.0250∗∗ 0.9781∗∗ 1.0448∗∗ 1.0481∗∗ 1.0094 1.0709∗∗ 1.1061∗∗
47 1.0292∗∗ 0.9768∗∗ 0.9942 0.9946∗ 1.0118 1.0481∗∗ 1.0004 1.0536∗∗ 1.1121∗∗
48 0.9619∗∗ 1.0046 1.0079 1.0103 1.0270 1.0787∗∗ 0.9939 1.1527∗∗ 1.2766∗∗
49 1.0289∗∗ 0.9923 1.0112 1.0872∗∗ 1.0590∗∗ 1.0353∗∗ 1.0331 1.1861∗∗ 1.2336∗∗
50 0.9815∗∗ 0.9983 0.9985 1.0019 1.0566∗∗ 1.0694∗∗ 0.9967 1.1346∗∗ 1.1872∗∗
Mean 1.0402∗∗∗ 0.9998 1.0066∗ 1.0059 1.0346∗∗∗ 1.0439∗∗∗ 1.0476∗∗∗ 1.0944∗∗∗ 1.1676∗∗∗
(∗), (∗∗), (∗∗∗): signiﬁcant diﬀerences from unity at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. In the case of the mean, signiﬁcance
was determined by appealing to the central limit theorem.Table 4: Changes in productivity, consecutive years and sub-periods
Firm 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1992/95 1995/98 1992/98
1 0.8943∗∗ 1.0846∗∗ 0.9951∗ 1.0046∗∗ 1.0149 1.1088∗∗ 0.9773∗∗ 1.1875∗∗ 1.0942∗∗
2 1.0495∗∗ 0.9717∗∗ 1.0041 1.0140∗ 1.0328∗∗ 1.0265 1.0267 1.0799∗∗ 1.0753∗∗
3 1.0951∗∗ 1.0510 1.0187 1.1203∗∗ 1.1320∗∗ 1.0585∗∗ 1.2005∗∗ 1.3209∗∗ 1.5479∗∗
4 0.9881 0.9677∗∗ 1.0300∗∗ 1.0059 1.0635∗∗ 1.1492∗∗ 1.0087 1.2516∗∗ 1.4914∗∗
5 1.1268∗∗ 1.0073 0.9569∗ 1.0755∗∗ 1.0880∗∗ 0.9960∗∗ 1.0933∗∗ 1.1709∗∗ 1.4008∗∗
6 1.0316 0.9842 0.9509∗ 0.9655∗∗ 1.0094 1.0087 0.9653 1.0024 1.0641∗∗
7 1.0866∗∗ 1.1051∗∗ 1.0452∗ 1.0027 1.0583∗∗ 1.1459∗∗ 1.2178∗∗ 1.2508∗∗ 1.5016∗∗
8 0.9773∗∗ 1.0506∗∗ 0.9934 1.0411∗∗ 1.0148 1.1007∗∗ 0.9814 1.1645∗∗ 1.1638∗∗
9 1.0495∗∗ 1.0498∗∗ 0.9614∗∗ 1.0192 1.0181 1.1101∗∗ 1.0984∗∗ 1.2266∗∗ 1.2738∗∗
10 1.0567∗∗ 0.9534∗∗ 1.0668∗∗ 1.0421∗∗ 0.9572∗∗ 0.9913 1.0753∗∗ 1.0000 1.0451
11 1.0363 0.9327∗∗ 1.0128 0.9989 1.0267∗∗ 0.9961∗∗ 0.9781∗∗ 1.0459∗∗ 0.9627∗∗
12 1.0481∗ 0.9276∗∗ 1.0236 0.9817 0.9820∗∗ 0.9993∗∗ 0.9946 0.9555∗∗ 0.9997∗∗
13 1.1371∗∗ 0.9055∗∗ 1.0144∗∗ 0.9452∗∗ 0.9905∗ 1.0067 1.0418 0.9812∗∗ 0.9861∗∗
14 1.0997∗∗ 1.1050∗∗ 0.9681∗∗ 1.0437∗∗ 1.0862∗∗ 1.0191 1.0921∗∗ 1.1349∗∗ 1.2551∗∗
15 1.0530∗∗ 1.0324 1.0807∗∗ 0.9848∗ 1.0805∗∗ 1.0960∗∗ 1.1569∗∗ 1.1475∗∗ 1.3147∗∗
16 1.0824∗∗ 0.9627∗∗ 1.0196 0.9959 1.0453∗∗ 1.0474∗∗ 1.0625∗∗ 1.0755∗∗ 1.0946∗∗
17 1.0173 0.9838∗ 1.0006 0.9767∗∗ 1.0190 1.0193 1.0052 1.0069 1.0237
18 1.0062 1.2533∗∗ 0.9337∗∗ 0.9911∗∗ 1.1758∗∗ 1.0963∗∗ 1.1645∗∗ 1.3421∗∗ 1.6722∗∗
19 1.0831∗∗ 0.9557 0.9780 1.0205 1.0136 1.0293 0.9969 1.0823∗ 1.1204∗∗
20 1.0478∗∗ 1.0032 1.0660∗∗ 0.9668∗ 0.9908 0.9465∗∗ 1.1385∗∗ 0.9511∗∗ 1.0397∗
21 1.0271 1.0320∗∗ 0.9286∗∗ 1.0358∗∗ 1.0210 1.0835∗∗ 0.9909 1.1511∗∗ 1.1668∗∗
22 1.0590∗∗ 0.9811 0.9710 1.0108 1.0337 1.0003∗∗ 1.0427 1.0614 1.2167∗∗
23 1.0671 0.9766∗ 0.8922∗∗ 1.1125∗∗ 1.0915∗∗ 1.0506∗∗ 0.9134∗∗ 1.2830∗∗ 1.1614∗∗
24 0.9725∗∗ 1.0404∗∗ 1.0318 1.0641∗∗ 1.0370 1.1321∗∗ 1.0779 1.1850∗∗ 1.4344∗∗
25 0.9639∗ 0.9684∗∗ 1.2003∗∗ 0.9967 0.9979∗∗ 1.1057∗∗ 1.1720∗∗ 1.1379∗∗ 1.3983∗∗
26 0.9813∗ 1.0137 1.0819∗∗ 1.0377∗∗ 1.0418∗ 1.0210 1.0474∗∗ 1.1198∗∗ 1.2175∗∗
27 0.9932 0.9748∗ 0.9211∗∗ 1.0010 1.0188 1.0718∗∗ 0.8873∗∗ 1.0979∗∗ 1.0500∗
28 1.0603∗∗ 1.0761∗∗ 1.0036∗∗ 0.9960 1.0636∗∗ 1.0626∗∗ 1.1328∗∗ 1.1071∗∗ 1.2543∗∗
29 1.0342∗∗ 0.9955 0.9675∗∗ 1.0136∗ 1.0163 1.0137 0.9936 1.0619∗∗ 1.0775∗∗
30 1.0847∗∗ 1.0449∗∗ 1.0732∗∗ 1.0084 0.9542∗∗ 1.0575∗∗ 1.1759∗∗ 1.0401 1.2173∗∗
31 1.0449∗ 0.9670 1.0311∗∗ 1.1522∗∗ 1.0470∗∗ 1.0257 1.0388∗∗ 1.2196∗∗ 1.2808∗∗
32 0.9824 1.0946∗∗ 0.9806 1.0680∗∗ 1.0193 1.0052 1.0505∗∗ 1.1048∗ 1.1994∗∗
33 1.3115∗∗ 0.9969 1.0468∗ 1.0806∗∗ 1.0589∗∗ 1.1296∗∗ 1.5049∗∗ 1.2945∗∗ 1.7527∗∗
34 1.0532∗∗ 0.9836 1.0067 1.0250∗∗ 1.0832∗∗ 0.9955 1.0559 1.0866∗∗ 1.0900∗∗
35 1.0478∗ 0.9699 0.9383∗∗ 0.9355∗∗ 0.9537∗∗ 1.0312∗∗ 0.9090∗∗ 0.9208∗∗ 0.8579∗∗
36 0.9914 1.0632∗∗ 1.0483∗∗ 1.0697∗∗ 1.0069 1.0418∗ 1.1033∗∗ 1.1400∗∗ 1.3243∗∗
37 1.0009 1.0517∗∗ 1.0020 1.0157 1.1147∗∗ 0.9847∗∗ 1.0270 1.1170∗∗ 1.1856∗∗
38 1.0106 0.9949 1.0191 0.9742 1.0916∗∗ 0.9450∗∗ 1.0073 1.0348 1.0159
39 1.0332 1.0082 0.9919 1.0511∗∗ 1.0232 0.9923 1.0379 1.0656∗∗ 1.2206∗∗
40 0.9226∗∗ 1.0570∗∗ 0.9350∗∗ 0.9941 1.0839∗∗ 1.0969∗∗ 0.9131∗∗ 1.2333∗∗ 1.1016∗∗
41 0.9568∗∗ 1.0158∗∗ 1.0145 0.9406∗∗ 0.9890∗ 1.0615∗∗ 0.9883 0.9903∗∗ 0.9872∗∗
42 1.1488∗∗ 0.9592∗∗ 1.0611∗∗ 1.0012 1.0106∗∗ 1.0102 1.1659∗∗ 0.9916∗∗ 1.1179∗
43 0.9876 1.0112 0.9798 1.0426 1.0197 1.1496∗∗ 1.0663 1.2060∗∗ 1.2807∗∗
44 1.0496∗∗ 0.9568∗∗ 0.9492∗∗ 1.0198∗ 1.0037 1.0480∗∗ 0.9486∗∗ 1.1015∗∗ 1.0170
45 1.0271 1.0498∗∗ 1.1114∗∗ 1.0642∗ 1.0841∗∗ 1.0717∗∗ 1.1788∗∗ 1.1707∗∗ 1.5775∗∗
46 1.0677∗∗ 1.0223 1.0327 1.0263∗∗ 1.0319 1.0457∗∗ 1.0812∗∗ 1.1072∗∗ 1.2250∗∗
47 1.0067 0.9730 0.9696∗ 0.9273∗∗ 1.0314∗ 1.0848∗∗ 0.9506∗∗ 1.0362 1.0393
48 0.9619 1.0046 0.9025∗∗ 0.9929 1.0297 1.0911∗∗ 0.8900∗∗ 1.1486∗∗ 1.1391
49 0.9553∗∗ 1.0334∗∗ 1.0575∗∗ 1.0872∗∗ 1.0590∗∗ 1.0353∗∗ 1.0447 1.1861∗∗ 1.2475∗∗
50 1.0478∗∗ 1.0207∗ 0.9394∗∗ 1.0423∗∗ 1.0923∗∗ 1.0694∗∗ 1.0235 1.2202∗∗ 1.3111∗∗
Mean 1.0344∗∗∗ 1.0109 1.0026 1.0186∗∗∗ 1.0372∗∗∗ 1.0481∗∗∗ 1.0491∗∗∗ 1.1156∗∗∗ 1.1920∗∗∗
(∗), (∗∗), (∗∗∗): signiﬁcant diﬀerences from unity at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. In the case of the mean, signiﬁcance
was determined by appealing to the central limit theorem.took place at rates exceeding 1% only in 1993/94 and 1995/96. There are even deteriorations in 1992/93
and 1994/95, although the overall tendency (1997/98) was to increase.
However, individual scrutiny shows that there are remarkable disparities between the three indices.
For instance, ﬁrm #1 underwent substantial productivity decline from 1992 to 1993 due to falling behind
“best practice” (or catching up with “worst practice”); in fact, there was technical progress of 3.68%.
On the other hand, and also in 1992/93, ﬁrm #50 experienced productivity growth (4.78%) due to an
improvement in eﬃciency, despite technical regress (1.85%).
Our results coincide with those of Pastor (1995), but diﬀer from those of Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell (1996).
They also coincide with those of Berg et al. (1992a), who ﬁnd productivity regress prior to deregulation,
but rapid productivity growth after deregulation—although we do not analyze the pre-deregulation era.
However, as stated by Grifell-Tatj´ e and Lovell (1996) it is perhaps surprising, and hopefully temporary,
but not unusual that a productivity decline should accompany deregulation. Some evidence was reported
by Bauer et al. (1993), or Humphrey (1993). But more recent evidence, employing linear programming
techniques such as ours, found productivity decline (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999). On the other hand,
our results are coincidental with the recent study by Mukherjee et al. (2001) who also through linear
programming techniques, ﬁnd productivity growth. As stated by these authors, a key diﬀerence may lie
in the identiﬁcation of outputs. We also think that the evolution of savings banks’ product mixes may
have played a non-negligible role in this process. In fact, one of the outputs (y3, non-traditional output)
includes items in an attempt to reﬂect the ﬁnancial innovation performed by most savings banks, which
in most cases has enabled them to increase their revenues.
In addition, our bootstrap method allows assessment of the “null hypothesis” of insigniﬁcant eﬃciency
change, technical change, and productivity growth/decline, which predicts that the corresponding measu-
res are not statistically diﬀerent from unity. Resampling has been carried out for B = 1000—i.e., we have
1000 pseudo-samples. We provide results for both 90% and 95% conﬁdence intervals. They allow assess-
ment of the null hypothesis of no eﬃciency change, technical change, or productivity growth/decline which
indicates that the corresponding measures are not statistically diﬀerent from unity. The interpretation is
straightforward. In the 95% conﬁdence interval case, if it contains the unity, then the corresponding mea-
sure is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one at the 5% signiﬁcance level, i.e., it is not possible to conclude
that changes occurred in eﬃciency, technology, or productivity. In contrast, when the interval excludes
the unity, one can conclude with 95% conﬁdence that the corresponding measure is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from unity. An analogous interpretation is applicable for the 90% conﬁdence interval, and conclusions
must be drawn at a 10% signiﬁcance level.
One conclusion from the original results is that a number of savings banks had productivity regress
in all periods. Speciﬁcally, table 4 shows that positive productivity change occurred in 36, 27, 28, 33, 42,
and 41 cases for periods 1992/93, 1993/94, 1994/95, 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98, respectively—for the
remainder, productivity decline occurred. If we consider longer periods, tendencies are more emphasized,
as productivity growth occurs in 34, 43, and 45 cases, for periods 1992/95, 1995/98, and 1992/98, respec-
tively. Put other way, considering the entire period 1992/98, all other institutions underwent productivity
growth with the exception of ﬁve ﬁrms. However, there are several cases in which the positive changesare not signiﬁcant. For instance, in 1992/93, out of the 14 ﬁrms which suﬀered productivity decline (i.e.,
negative values), only 6 (ﬁrms #1, 8, 24, 40, 41 and 49) diﬀered from unity at 5% signiﬁcance level, 2
(ﬁrms #25 and 26) diﬀered from unity at 10% signiﬁcance level and, in 6 cases (ﬁrms #4, 27, 32, 36, 43
and 48), productivity decline was not statistically signiﬁcant. Similar trends hold for the 36 ﬁrms which
underwent productivity growth, out of which productivity growth is statistically signiﬁcant at 5% on 21
occasions, and at 1% in the other four cases. In the remaining 11 ﬁrms productivity growth estimates are
not signiﬁcant and hence cannot be determined.
Diﬀerences in conclusions between the original and the bootstrap results are more evident when scru-
tinizing certain particular cases. For instance, from the original results we would conclude that ﬁrm
#19 in 1993/94 had a productivity decline amounting to about 4.4% (see table 4); in contrast, ﬁrm #15
experienced productivity growth amounting to about 3.2%. However, the conclusion from the bootstrap
results is that neither of these two savings banks had a change in productivity signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
unity.
Turning to the results for eﬃciency change (table 2) we note that three ﬁrms were eﬃcient (“best-
practice”) in all time periods (ﬁrms #3, 6, 33) as revealed by values of unity between all successive pairs of
years and sub-periods. Our bootstrap reveals an additional bank (#39) to be eﬃcient in all years, as the
ﬁgures diverging from unity are not signiﬁcant. In addition, if we only consider the non-consecutive years
analysis (1992/95, 1995/98, 1992/98), there are two additional ﬁrms with no eﬃciency changes (ﬁrms
#20, 39), and a further three ﬁrms whose eﬃciency gains or losses are not signiﬁcant (ﬁrms #10, 34, 49).
We also observe that signiﬁcant changes in eﬃciency occur mainly for the whole period 1992/98. In other
periods (for instance, 1992/95) there are eﬃciency changes for most ﬁrms, although most of them are not
signiﬁcant. In sum, for the consecutive pairs of years, out of the 234 estimates that showed eﬃciency gain
or loss, only 135 and 17 diﬀered signiﬁcantly from unity at 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
When considering longer periods, these percentages are much higher, particularly in 1992/98.
Finally, for the technical change component (table 3), a negative shift in technology is obtained for 77
ﬁrms in the original results for the consecutive years, out of which our bootstrap method recognized only
31 cases to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity at 5%, and 8 at 10%. For the remainder, technical regress
was not statistically signiﬁcant. The positive change occurs more often, in 221 instances—out of the 300
entries for consecutive years—, but only 132 are statistically diﬀerent from unity at 5%, and 9 at 10%.
Again, for the remainder, technical progress is not signiﬁcant.
However, for the sub-periods results vary to a certain extent. Considering the entire 1992/98 period
(last column of table 3), technical change is positive for all ﬁrms except ﬁrms #16 and 35. The former
experiences insigniﬁcant technical regress, and the latter experiences signiﬁcant technical regress, although
only at 10% signiﬁcance level. A further three ﬁrms experience technical progress, although at insigniﬁcant
rates (ﬁrms #11, 20, 27). These changes are decomposable into two sub-periods. In the initial 1992/95
post-deregulation period, the mean for technical progress is lower than in 1995/98 (1.0476 vs. 1.0944).
The former was the period before which the bulk of mergers had just occurred, hence one might expect
technology to improve slowly. In fact, signiﬁcant (at 5%) technical progress is found only for 26 ﬁrms. In
1995/98 this pattern is present in 41 instances.Therefore, according to the above statements, one may easily conclude that comparisons of production
units based on the original point estimates should be made with caution. In many instances, the produc-
tivity, eﬃciency, and technical change estimates deviate from unity at insigniﬁcant levels, which clearly
lowers the extent to which our conclusions are convincing. In other words, as suggested by Simar and
Wilson (1999a), “as with any estimator, it is not enough to know whether the Malmquist productivity
index indicates increases or decreases in productivity, but whether the indicated changes are signiﬁcant
in a statistical sense”.
5.2. Productive eﬃciency
Tables 5–7 show results for the bootstrap of eﬃciency scores for years 1992, 1995, and 1998—for the sake
of brevity.14 A summary is presented in table 8, which shows that eﬃciency at industry level (mean
eﬃciency) enhanced slightly over the sample period—although notable ups and downs also occurred. The
result coincides with what may a priori be expected in an industry in which deregulation has already
taken place. However, the industry is still going through important changes.
Out of the 50 savings banks in the original sample, an average of 15 banks were found to operate on
the best practice frontier (ˆ θi = 1). As stated by Ferrier and Hirschberg (1997), this result does not supply
much information to decision makers as it is not possible to distinguish between the performances of many
of the banks. In these circumstances, our bootstrap procedure turns out to be a very useful tool.
Columns 2–5 in tables 5, 6 and 7 provide the original DEA eﬃciency score, the bootstrap bias estimate,
the bias-corrected estimate, and the median of the bootstrapped values, respectively. In addition, columns
6–9 provide two types of 95% conﬁdence intervals for the bias-corrected eﬃciency scores, although results
are quite similar. Speciﬁcally, columns 6 and 7 are the conﬁdence interval based on the bias-correction
formula in (19), whereas columns 8 and 9 were computed according to Efron and Tibshirani (1993). All
results in those tables were computed considering the smoothing parameters displayed in ﬁgure 1.
These results reveal the sensitivity of the eﬃciency measures with respect to sampling variation. The
bias-corrected estimates (˜ θi) in column 4 reveal that diﬀerences in measured eﬃciency are of a diﬀerent
magnitude than when original eﬃciency scores (ˆ θi) are considered.15 Speciﬁcally, we observe that for
some ﬁrms eﬃciency enhances, whereas for others it deteriorates. In 1992 (table 5) there are 7 ﬁrms (#9,
17, 32, 38, 41, 42 and 49) for which the bias-corrected estimate is higher than the original one.16 On the
other hand, there are many others for which eﬃciency declines. Among these, there are some cases in
which eﬃciency deteriorates severely, by more than 0.1 (ﬁrms #4, 5, 16, 18, 30, 45), or by more than 0.05
(ﬁrms #2, 10, 14, 15, 23, 24, 31, 36, 37, 50). In the case of the originally-eﬃcient ﬁrms (with ˆ θi =1 .000)
eﬃciency improves; obviously, there is no economic meaning for this, and we should interpret it as if these
indices were one. However, we also have additional statistical information on these ﬁrms, as conﬁdence
intervals are constructed. We will examine this below.
14Results for all years are available from the authors upon request.
15However, as stated by Gonz´ alez and Miles (2002), results should be interpreted with care, as values less than zero or
greater than one are statistically valid and reﬂect the eﬃciency level of a ﬁrm, but they have no economic meaning—eﬃciency
scores are bounded between zero and one.
16Those ﬁrms with bias-corrected eﬃciency estimate greater than one are interpreted as if it were one.Table 5: Bootstrap of eﬃciency scores, 1992
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Firm ˆ θi Biasi ˜ θi Median of ˜ θ∗
i Bias corrected Centered on ˜ θi
1 1.0000 −0.0363 1.0363 1.0643 0.9151 1.0726 0.8763 1.0726
2 0.8934 0.0517 0.8417 0.8563 0.7021 0.8965 0.6871 0.8965
3 1.0000 −0.0161 1.0161 1.0323 0.9072 1.0323 0.8532 1.0323
4 0.8571 0.1063 0.7508 0.7777 0.6151 0.7874 0.5917 0.7874
5 0.8431 0.1250 0.7181 0.7474 0.5925 0.7500 0.5426 0.7500
6 1.0000 −0.0001 1.0001 1.0001 0.9996 1.0001 0.9892 1.0001
7 0.9531 0.0087 0.9444 0.9681 0.8116 0.9826 0.7867 0.9826
8 0.9162 0.0354 0.8807 0.8993 0.7438 0.9292 0.7286 0.9292
9 0.9597 −0.0009 0.9606 0.9855 0.8321 1.0018 0.8034 1.0018
10 0.8561 0.0860 0.7700 0.7822 0.6342 0.8280 0.6224 0.8280
11 1.0000 −0.0445 1.0445 1.0666 0.9000 1.0890 0.8762 1.0890
12 1.0000 −0.0288 1.0288 1.0577 0.9060 1.0577 0.8403 1.0577
13 0.9215 0.0257 0.8957 0.9127 0.7630 0.9485 0.7397 0.9485
14 0.8778 0.0697 0.8081 0.8229 0.6789 0.8606 0.6622 0.8606
15 0.9016 0.0611 0.8405 0.8695 0.7049 0.8777 0.6732 0.8777
16 0.7952 0.1482 0.6470 0.6631 0.5047 0.7035 0.4838 0.7035
17 0.9770 −0.0304 1.0075 1.0254 0.8694 1.0609 0.8494 1.0609
18 0.7764 0.1845 0.5919 0.6192 0.4688 0.6311 0.4422 0.6311
19 0.9550 0.0017 0.9533 0.9759 0.8206 0.9967 0.7969 0.9967
20 1.0000 −0.0041 1.0041 1.0082 0.9475 1.0082 0.8811 1.0082
21 0.9367 0.0087 0.9279 0.9434 0.7890 0.9825 0.7614 0.9825
22 1.0000 −0.0083 1.0083 1.0166 0.9226 1.0166 0.8751 1.0166
23 0.8708 0.0917 0.7790 0.8049 0.6482 0.8166 0.6167 0.8166
24 0.9081 0.0552 0.8528 0.8827 0.7192 0.8896 0.6769 0.8896
25 0.9248 0.0373 0.8875 0.9142 0.7445 0.9255 0.7160 0.9255
26 0.9179 0.0261 0.8917 0.9089 0.7488 0.9477 0.7339 0.9477
27 1.0000 −0.0078 1.0078 1.0156 0.9297 1.0156 0.8660 1.0156
28 0.9458 0.0001 0.9457 0.9587 0.8136 0.9998 0.8003 0.9998
29 1.0000 −0.0244 1.0244 1.0488 0.9054 1.0488 0.8407 1.0488
30 0.8287 0.1118 0.7169 0.7318 0.5826 0.7763 0.5699 0.7763
31 0.8797 0.0777 0.8020 0.8254 0.6614 0.8446 0.6318 0.8446
32 0.9685 −0.0156 0.9842 1.0065 0.8478 1.0312 0.8262 1.0312
33 1.0000 −0.0006 1.0006 1.0012 0.9982 1.0012 0.9293 1.0012
34 1.0000 −0.0350 1.0350 1.0628 0.9046 1.0701 0.8818 1.0701
35 0.9179 0.0455 0.8724 0.9035 0.7307 0.9090 0.6956 0.9090
36 0.8855 0.0696 0.8159 0.8352 0.6746 0.8608 0.6432 0.8608
37 0.8660 0.0754 0.7906 0.8063 0.6517 0.8491 0.6384 0.8491
38 0.9693 −0.0279 0.9971 1.0104 0.8608 1.0557 0.8456 1.0557
39 1.0000 −0.0321 1.0321 1.0638 0.9090 1.0641 0.8662 1.0641
40 0.9396 0.0130 0.9266 0.9481 0.7911 0.9740 0.7661 0.9740
41 0.9469 −0.0077 0.9546 0.9645 0.8200 1.0154 0.8052 1.0154
42 0.9709 −0.0145 0.9853 1.0126 0.8427 1.0289 0.8182 1.0289
43 1.0000 −0.0005 1.0005 1.0010 0.9995 1.0010 0.9482 1.0008
44 0.9093 0.0335 0.8758 0.8891 0.7399 0.9329 0.7194 0.9329
45 0.8541 0.1021 0.7520 0.7726 0.6239 0.7958 0.6032 0.7958
46 0.8005 0.1551 0.6454 0.6653 0.5223 0.6898 0.4902 0.6898
47 0.9483 0.0049 0.9434 0.9639 0.8057 0.9903 0.7749 0.9903
48 1.0000 −0.0123 1.0123 1.0246 0.9059 1.0246 0.8633 1.0246
49 0.9889 −0.0238 1.0127 1.0412 0.8775 1.0477 0.8277 1.0477
50 0.9055 0.0563 0.8491 0.8767 0.7194 0.8874 0.6889 0.8874Table 6: Bootstrap of eﬃciency scores, 1995
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Firm ˆ θi Biasi ˜ θi Median of ˜ θ∗
i Bias corrected Centered on ˜ θi
1 0.8809 0.0794 0.8015 0.8270 0.6660 0.8413 0.6291 0.8413
2 0.8628 0.0920 0.7709 0.7921 0.6348 0.8160 0.6117 0.8160
3 1.0000 −0.0136 1.0136 1.0271 0.9129 1.0271 0.8424 1.0271
4 0.8506 0.1068 0.7438 0.7681 0.6107 0.7864 0.5783 0.7864
5 0.9532 −0.0018 0.9550 0.9726 0.8164 1.0036 0.7867 1.0036
6 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9958 1.0000
7 1.0000 −0.0021 1.0021 1.0042 0.9627 1.0042 0.8950 1.0042
8 0.8928 0.0548 0.8379 0.8567 0.7085 0.8904 0.6679 0.8904
9 0.9806 −0.0130 0.9936 1.0236 0.8698 1.0261 0.8246 1.0261
10 0.8566 0.0900 0.7665 0.7823 0.6357 0.8199 0.6023 0.8199
11 0.9191 0.0348 0.8843 0.9043 0.7436 0.9305 0.7120 0.9305
12 1.0000 −0.0458 1.0458 1.0619 0.9144 1.0917 0.8908 1.0917
13 0.9262 0.0284 0.8978 0.9178 0.7628 0.9432 0.7275 0.9432
14 0.8918 0.0630 0.8288 0.8497 0.6870 0.8741 0.6549 0.8741
15 1.0000 −0.0478 1.0478 1.0673 0.9182 1.0956 0.8777 1.0956
16 0.8202 0.1289 0.6913 0.7086 0.5593 0.7421 0.5280 0.7421
17 0.9272 0.0187 0.9085 0.9233 0.7756 0.9627 0.7495 0.9627
18 0.8926 0.0612 0.8314 0.8503 0.6909 0.8776 0.6606 0.8776
19 1.0000 −0.0514 1.0514 1.0683 0.9144 1.1029 0.8868 1.1029
20 1.0000 −0.0043 1.0043 1.0086 0.9421 1.0086 0.8655 1.0086
21 0.9283 0.0207 0.9075 0.9256 0.7651 0.9585 0.7426 0.9585
22 1.0000 −0.0236 1.0236 1.0471 0.8938 1.0471 0.8498 1.0471
23 0.7631 0.1911 0.5720 0.5936 0.4418 0.6179 0.4077 0.6179
24 0.8873 0.0735 0.8138 0.8370 0.6771 0.8530 0.6507 0.8530
25 1.0000 −0.0179 1.0179 1.0357 0.9074 1.0357 0.8301 1.0357
26 0.9576 −0.0039 0.9614 0.9793 0.8289 1.0077 0.8014 1.0077
27 0.9728 −0.0258 0.9986 1.0137 0.8574 1.0516 0.8348 1.0516
28 0.9004 0.0650 0.8354 0.8682 0.7111 0.8700 0.6490 0.8700
29 0.9684 −0.0139 0.9823 1.0027 0.8482 1.0278 0.8137 1.0278
30 0.9544 −0.0041 0.9586 0.9751 0.8299 1.0083 0.7954 1.0083
31 0.9359 0.0172 0.9187 0.9401 0.7829 0.9657 0.7486 0.9657
32 0.9970 −0.0470 1.0440 1.0600 0.9070 1.0940 0.8777 1.0940
33 1.0000 −0.0001 1.0001 1.0002 0.9999 1.0002 0.9896 1.0001
34 0.9697 −0.0071 0.9769 1.0047 0.8482 1.0142 0.7932 1.0142
35 0.8600 0.0987 0.7613 0.7842 0.6309 0.8026 0.5897 0.8026
36 0.9404 0.0192 0.9212 0.9451 0.7981 0.9617 0.7597 0.9617
37 0.8929 0.0621 0.8308 0.8487 0.6991 0.8759 0.6679 0.8759
38 0.9441 0.0051 0.9389 0.9591 0.7953 0.9897 0.7718 0.9897
39 1.0000 −0.0128 1.0128 1.0256 0.9229 1.0256 0.8579 1.0256
40 0.7987 0.1474 0.6513 0.6665 0.5052 0.7051 0.4821 0.7051
41 0.9304 0.0155 0.9149 0.9276 0.7813 0.9689 0.7643 0.9689
42 0.9864 −0.0284 1.0148 1.0433 0.8772 1.0567 0.8466 1.0567
43 0.9727 −0.0118 0.9845 1.0142 0.8422 1.0236 0.8067 1.0236
44 0.8328 0.1156 0.7172 0.7342 0.5758 0.7688 0.5515 0.7688
45 1.0000 −0.0350 1.0350 1.0634 0.9061 1.0700 0.8663 1.0700
46 0.8575 0.0939 0.7636 0.7812 0.6296 0.8122 0.5999 0.8122
47 0.9011 0.0444 0.8567 0.8703 0.7232 0.9112 0.6999 0.9112
48 0.8955 0.0609 0.8346 0.8532 0.7031 0.8782 0.6724 0.8782
49 1.0000 −0.0315 1.0315 1.0631 0.8989 1.0631 0.8660 1.0631
50 0.9298 0.0232 0.9066 0.9266 0.7725 0.9536 0.7487 0.9536Table 7: Bootstrap of eﬃciency scores, 1998
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5%
Firm ˆ θi Biasi ˜ θi Median of ˜ θ∗
i Bias corrected Centered on ˜ θi
1 0.9803 −0.0201 1.0004 1.0208 0.8851 1.0401 0.8476 1.0401
2 0.9228 0.0393 0.8835 0.9036 0.7702 0.9213 0.7268 0.9213
3 1.0000 −0.0003 1.0003 1.0006 1.0006 1.0006 0.9498 0.9814
4 0.9277 0.0395 0.8883 0.9163 0.7696 0.9211 0.7339 0.9211
5 0.9113 0.0576 0.8537 0.8815 0.7387 0.8848 0.6929 0.8848
6 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9997 1.0000
7 1.0000 −0.0011 1.0011 1.0022 0.9873 1.0022 0.9269 1.0022
8 0.9779 −0.0188 0.9967 1.0169 0.8846 1.0376 0.8522 1.0376
9 1.0000 −0.0014 1.0014 1.0027 0.9830 1.0027 0.9172 1.0027
10 0.8647 0.0921 0.7726 0.7953 0.6464 0.8159 0.6221 0.8159
11 0.9504 0.0101 0.9404 0.9603 0.8362 0.9798 0.7928 0.9798
12 0.8889 0.0754 0.8135 0.8360 0.7019 0.8492 0.6575 0.8492
13 0.8356 0.1225 0.7132 0.7300 0.5831 0.7551 0.5661 0.7551
14 0.9609 0.0078 0.9531 0.9802 0.8475 0.9844 0.8052 0.9844
15 1.0000 −0.0031 1.0031 1.0063 0.9590 1.0063 0.8986 1.0063
16 0.8758 0.0822 0.7936 0.8148 0.6762 0.8356 0.6405 0.8356
17 0.9364 0.0264 0.9100 0.9334 0.7868 0.9472 0.7508 0.9472
18 0.9639 0.0051 0.9588 0.9872 0.8470 0.9898 0.7985 0.9898
19 1.0000 −0.0313 1.0313 1.0591 0.9133 1.0627 0.8845 1.0627
20 1.0000 −0.0061 1.0061 1.0122 0.9473 1.0122 0.8860 1.0122
21 0.9945 −0.0364 1.0309 1.0474 0.8928 1.0729 0.8772 1.0729
22 0.9069 0.0598 0.8471 0.8746 0.7211 0.8804 0.6909 0.8804
23 0.9409 0.0223 0.9186 0.9395 0.8039 0.9554 0.7706 0.9554
24 0.9606 0.0050 0.9555 0.9789 0.8474 0.9899 0.8025 0.9899
25 0.9664 −0.0013 0.9677 0.9938 0.8572 1.0026 0.8148 1.0026
26 0.9952 −0.0345 1.0297 1.0502 0.9123 1.0690 0.8744 1.0690
27 1.0000 −0.0360 1.0360 1.0562 0.9283 1.0719 0.8857 1.0719
28 1.0000 −0.0174 1.0174 1.0349 0.9194 1.0349 0.8661 1.0349
29 0.9982 −0.0380 1.0362 1.0572 0.9206 1.0761 0.8935 1.0761
30 0.9028 0.0592 0.8435 0.8676 0.7206 0.8815 0.6863 0.8815
31 1.0000 −0.0117 1.0117 1.0233 0.9237 1.0233 0.8755 1.0233
32 0.9659 −0.0028 0.9687 0.9965 0.8481 1.0056 0.8110 1.0056
33 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9984 1.0000
34 1.0000 −0.0028 1.0028 1.0056 0.9560 1.0056 0.9054 1.0056
35 0.8007 0.1601 0.6406 0.6602 0.5244 0.6798 0.4868 0.6798
36 0.9586 −0.0008 0.9594 0.9784 0.8386 1.0015 0.8126 1.0015
37 0.9047 0.0640 0.8407 0.8691 0.7246 0.8720 0.6863 0.8720
38 0.9505 0.0132 0.9373 0.9627 0.8276 0.9736 0.7919 0.9736
39 1.0000 −0.0184 1.0184 1.0368 0.9203 1.0368 0.8623 1.0368
40 0.9259 0.0339 0.8921 0.9103 0.7858 0.9323 0.7447 0.9323
41 0.8703 0.0889 0.7814 0.8005 0.6649 0.8222 0.6268 0.8222
42 0.9247 0.0363 0.8885 0.9090 0.7650 0.9274 0.7390 0.9274
43 1.0000 −0.0377 1.0377 1.0584 0.9261 1.0754 0.8913 1.0754
44 0.8755 0.0838 0.7916 0.8100 0.6769 0.8323 0.6434 0.8323
45 1.0000 −0.0167 1.0167 1.0335 0.9275 1.0335 0.8574 1.0335
46 0.8866 0.0844 0.8022 0.8305 0.7043 0.8312 0.6473 0.8312
47 0.8862 0.0737 0.8125 0.8322 0.6977 0.8526 0.6628 0.8526
48 0.8923 0.0715 0.8208 0.8476 0.7063 0.8571 0.6687 0.8571
49 1.0000 −0.0367 1.0367 1.0582 0.9354 1.0734 0.8863 1.0734
50 1.0000 −0.0331 1.0331 1.0576 0.9251 1.0662 0.8874 1.0662
Table 8: Productive eﬃciency in Spanish banks, 1992–98
Mean Maximum (#) Minimum
1992 0.9313 1.000 (14/50) 0.7764
1993 0.9264 1.000 (16/50) 0.7754
1994 0.9361 1.000 (13/50) 0.8045
1995 0.9326 1.000 (13/50) 0.7631
1996 0.9442 1.000 (18/50) 0.8124
1997 0.9465 1.000 (17/50) 0.7910
1998 0.9501 1.000 (17/50) 0.8007For years 1995 and 1998 (tables 6 and 7) we also have results on whether ﬁrms’ eﬃciency improves
or deteriorates. However, we should stress that, over time, there are fewer ﬁrms for which bias-corrected
eﬃciency is substantially lower—in 1998, there are only 2 ﬁrms (#13, 35) for which eﬃciency worsens by
more than 0.1.
However, to properly interpret the bias-corrected estimators ˜ θi in each table—particularly those larger
than one—we must use information on conﬁdence intervals, which deﬁne the statistical location of the
true eﬃciency. Broadly, they show that eﬃciency scores, when adding statistical precision, overlap to
a notable extent. For instance, in table 5, using the intervals in columns 5–6, we notice that ﬁrm #2
overlaps with ﬁrms #4, 8, or 10, amongst others, despite their diﬀering bias-corrected eﬃciency estimates.
On the other hand, ﬁrm #2 does not overlap with ﬁrms #3 or 11, for instance. This overlap occurs not
only when the bias corrected intervals are considered but also when we consider the intervals centered
on ˆ θi (columns 7–8). Therefore, in many instances there is no enough empirical evidence to reject the
hypothesis that two ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient. Consequently, as stated by Simar and Wilson (1998), we
should be particularly cautious when making relative comparisons of the performances among ﬁrms based
on the original eﬃciency scores ˆ θi. In our particular case, results show that disparities are much wider
when the bootstrap analysis is performed.
However, further information is available. Figure 3 contains box plots which disclose information
about the distributions of each ﬁrm’s pseudo sample. The main advantage of this representation is that
when simultaneously displaying several box plots, it is easier to see whether diﬀerences exist both between
ﬁrms and for the same ﬁrm over time. Examples are the existence, emergence, or vanishing of outliers,
dispersion or concentration of data, or the symmetry (or asymmetry) of the distribution.
The vertical axis of each sub-ﬁgure 3.a–3.c represents the variable’s scale. The box represents the
interquartile range (IQR). The 0.75 and 0.25 quartiles (ξ.75 and ξ.25), deﬁne the upper and lower segments,
respectively. 50% of the distribution of probability mass is inside the box. Thus, its height represents
the IQR, a usual dispersion measure. A small IQR is small results in a short box, revealing that 50% of
the density is fairly concentrated. The horizontal line inside the box is the median, or 0.50 quartile. Its
location relative to the upper or lower limits of the box provides graphical information about the shape
of the distribution. If it is not in the center of the box, the distribution is asymmetric. Two vertical
lines are shown in the upper and lower limits of the box. The end of each line is known as the adjacent
value (whisker), either upper or lower. In fact, the maximum distance between whiskers is given by the
[ξ.25 − 1.5R(ξ.25),ξ .75 +1 .5R(ξ.25)] interval, where R(ξ.25) is the IQR. Therefore, the whiskers deﬁne the
natural bounds of the distributions, and the crosses represent outliers lying outside them.
Figure 3 indicates how sensitive a particular ﬁrm’s eﬃciency score is to variations in the eﬃciency
of other ﬁrms in the data set. For instance, ﬁrm #1 in 1992 has an original eﬃciency score of ˆ θi =1 ;
ﬁgure 3.a shows that it is ostensibly eﬃcient. The box above unity does not mean we get eﬃciency scores
above unity—which may not occur. As suggested earlier in the paper, those bootstrapped values above
unity should be treated as 1. There are ﬁrms for which this occurs to a greater extent. For example, all
bootstrapped eﬃciency scores for ﬁrm #6 in 1992 are 1, as shown by a single point in ﬁgure 3.a, with no

































































































































































































































































This paper has applied recently devised approaches to bootstrapping both Malmquist productivity indices
and eﬃciency scores to a database of Spanish savings banks over the initial 1992–1998 post-deregulation
period. Although results on the two issues overlap to a great extent, we will summarize them separately.
With regard to productivity indices, the picture that emerges is one of productivity growth due to an
improvement of production possibilities. Only the ﬁrms lagging behind the eﬃcient frontier lessen such
growth. This occurs due to the technical progress which took place at particularly high rate in 1992/93,
1996/97 and 1997/98. As a result, on average, ﬁrms are able to provide 119% as much service per unit of
resource consumed as they were providing just six years earlier.
The bootstrap allows for a more careful analysis of what happens at ﬁrm level. Speciﬁcally, the original
results show that, over the entire period (1992/98), about 90% of ﬁrms grew in terms of productivity.
However, not every ﬁrm had Malmquist productivity indices signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity at 5%. In
contrast, only 10% of ﬁrms suﬀered productivity decline, and in all cases it was statistically signiﬁcant at
5%. Therefore, the bootstrap backs up the conclusions provided by the original indices. A similar pattern
is observed in the technical change component. In this case, only two ﬁrms experienced technological
regress which, in addition, was signiﬁcant in just one case (and at the 10% signiﬁcance level). We can
thus verify that productivity regress is due mainly to declines in eﬃciency.
Concerning eﬃciency scores, the contribution of the bootstrap is similar. Speciﬁcally, mean technical
eﬃciency is quite high, and does not vary greatly over the sample period. However, it seems that there
are substantial disparities between ﬁrms but, at the same time, some ﬁrms have more similar eﬃciencies
than what was suggested by the “original” eﬃciency scores, and vice versa.
These results are coincidental with what might a priori be expected in a context of deregulation.
They are similar to those obtained by Mukherjee et al. (2001), Gilbert and Wilson (1998) or Berg et al.
(1992b). However, they run counter to Wheelock and Wilson (1999)—although they consider a diﬀerent
Malmquist productivity index decomposition. If we consider the Spanish experience, our results are
coincidental with those obtained by Pastor (1995), but diﬀer from those obtained by Grifell-Tatj´ ea n d
Lovell (1996). The latter, however, is not paradoxical, as their choice of outputs diﬀers from ours, and, of
particular importance, their sample period is also diﬀerent.
The reasons underlying these trends may arise from diﬀerent sources. Productivity growth could partly
come from the diﬃculties aﬀecting many savings banks engaged in M&As. New ﬁrms were created, and
some of them had branches which were concentrated too locally. After closing down the geographically
closest branches, eﬃciency and productivity gains might have been substantial. Other ﬁrms engaged in
rapid geographic expansion. There has also been a dramatic boom in mutual funds to the detriment of
deposits; their loss may have not been oﬀset by the increase in fee-income, which is accounted for in our
deﬁnition of outputs.
In a further study, we will explore these details more deeply, to ﬁnd out not only which ﬁrms experience
faster productivity growth, but also which undergo stronger sampling variation, and what might determine
this. Another more technically arduous stem of research should attempt to address the problem ofbootstrapping cost and, possibly, proﬁt and revenue eﬃciency scores. This is especially relevant in banking
where, in contrast to public sector studies, prices are usually available.
All computations were performed using MATLAB code written by the authors. For bootstrapping
technical eﬃciency scores we had additional problems, as it requires univariate nonparametric density
estimation and, consequently, a bandwidth choice. Plug-in rules, which seem to be reasonably reliable in
terms of a fair balance between bias and variance, are provided in Sheather and Jones (1991). Their MA-
TLAB code (bwsjpiSM.m) is available through URL:http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/marron.html.
We easily incorporated this code into ours. However, in the case of Malmquist productivity indices we
have panel data which requires bivariate density estimation. This was also performed via kernel smoot-
hing. In this case the state of the art does not provide such satisfactory bandwidths as those for the
univariate case. Wand and Jones (1994) provide plug-in methods, although they are somewhat diﬃcult
to implement in MATLAB, as they are originally written in S-PLUS.17 We therefore used those suggested
by Simar and Wilson (1999a). We do however recognize that there is still room for improvement on this
matter.
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